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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 October 1983

Security Conditions in South Korea During President Reagan's Visit

ADDENDUM I*

Although we do not see a high likelihood of a direct threat to the security of President Reagan or his party while in South Korea, the recent bombing incident in Rangoon has raised the level of tension on the Korean peninsula. P'yongyang's clandestine propaganda radio continues to reflect North Korea's opposition to the President's visit by repeating earlier warnings that anti-US sentiment in the South will lead to a "stern punishment" should the visit take place. Such propaganda, however, is a common response to US actions that symbolize support for Seoul, and we do not believe it constitutes a threat against the President.

Burmese investigators have uncovered evidence pointing to likely North Korean involvement in the bombing, and, if confirmed, the terrorist act will represent a departure from the less confrontational tactics pursued by P'yongyang in recent years. Growing conviction in South Korea that North Korea was responsible for the bombing will put pressure on President Chun to retaliate, but his options are limited by security concerns.

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of East Asian Analysi in support of President Reagan's East Asian trip.	.s 25 X 1
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	,
	Both the South Korean Army
	and Air Force have standing contingency plans for
	limited retaliation in kind, but these clearly cannot
	take into account all current strategic and tactical considerations.
	Constact a crons.
****	The country is united by its outrage, and Chun must carefully weigh his next move in order to maintain
	confidence in his leadership as evidence of North
	Korean culpability builds.
	Chun has little room to maneuver, however, and he
	almost certainly recognizes that direct retaliation
	could escalate into open conflict.
	For the moment, Chun does not appear prone to
	immoderate actions, and must balance pressures for
	revenge against longer term strategicand economic considerations.
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	Chun's actions are likely to be tempered by his desire not to cause postponement of your visit. The visit is
	now of greater importance to Chun as a sign of
	Washington's long term security commitment to Secul

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